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Ugly American hermeneutics
Hermenêutica americana feia
Francis Joseph Mootz III1
William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, USA
jay.mootz@unlv.edu

Abstract
This article is part of a Symposium that provides a forum for comparing legal hermeneutics as articulated by four scholars from the United States and four scholars from
Brazil. The article embraces this cross-cultural event by asking whether American legal
hermeneutics is “ugly” and is practiced by “ugly Americans.” The pejorative cast of this
terminology is obvious and intentional, but it is also ambiguous and multi-layered. The
Essay unfolds various dimensions of ugly American hermeneutics and suggests that ugly though they may be -American scholars still can make some important contributions to the worldwide conversation regarding legal hermeneutics. It is their plain-faced
pragmatism, perhaps, that is the source of our contribution even as it casts them (sometimes unfairly) as the ugly Americans. The Article discusses the political spectacle of
appointment of new Supreme Court Justices, and the reductive efforts of some Justices
to reduce judgment to simplistic history by means of the theory of “new originalism.”
Key words: hermeneutics, United States, Brazil, America, justice.

Resumo
Este artigo é parte de um Simpósio que fornece um fórum para comparar a hermenêutica
jurídica articulada por quatro estudiosos dos Estados Unidos e quatro estudiosos do
Brasil. O artigo abarca este evento intercultural perguntando se a hermenêutica jurídica
americana é “feia” e praticada por “americanos feios”. O matiz pejorativo desta terminologia
é obvio e intencional, mas também é ambíguo e com várias camadas. O trabalho desdobra
várias dimensões da hermenêutica americana feia e sugere que – embora possam ser
feios – os estudiosos americanos ainda podem dar algumas importantes contribuições
para a conversação mundial sobre hermenêutica jurídica. É o seu pragmatismo simples
ou comum, talvez, que é a fonte de nossa contribuição mesmo que os faça parecer (às
vezes injustamente) como os americanos feios. O Artigo discute o espetáculo político de
nomeação de novos juízes da Suprema Corte, e os esforços redutivos de alguns deles para
reduzir o julgamento à história simplista, por meio da teoria do “novo originalismo.”
Palavras-chave: hermenêutica, Estados Unidos, Brasil, América, justiça.
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Introduction
The 1958 best-selling novel, The Ugly American
(Lederer and Burdick, 1958) gave rise to a common
epithet that gained renewed currency during the administration of President George W. Bush. The novel
depicts American diplomats and ofﬁcials in a series of
short vignettes principally set in the ﬁctional country
of Sarkhan. Most of the Americans are loud, arrogant,
ignorant, racist, and cloistered. They fail to understand
that the communists are able to gain traction in Southeast Asia because they don’t despise the local people
and their culture. The ugliness of these Americans is a
serious matter that has profound consequences, but
there are some heroes. Ironically, the “ugly American” in
the story of the same name is a plain-looking man who
doesn’t fall into the behavioral trap that snares the best
and the brightest of America’s diplomatic corps. He is a
humble and diligent worker who is accomplishing more
than all the tuxedoed charge d’affaires combined.
The epithet “ugly American” has morphed into a
more general caricature of American tourists, who reportedly arrive at a foreign destination and demand that
others speak English and attend to their needs, all the
while making a loud and garish spectacle of themselves.
The ugliness in this iteration of the phrase is more cultural and aesthetic, less political and social. Although
aesthetics cannot be divorced wholly from social and
political considerations, this valence of ugliness is different. It is abrasive and strange rather than wrongheaded
and offensive. Despite their frustration with invading
tourists from America, I expect that many foreigners
ﬁnd these same characteristics more palatable when
they visit the United States. The same behavior is experienced as open and authentic when it occurs within
the American context. The brashness and directness of
New Yorkers, the friendliness of Midwesterners, and the
libertarian attitude of Westerners all have a certain validity until these various Americans are uprooted and let
loose in Paris or São Paulo.
This Symposium provides a forum for comparing
legal hermeneutics as articulated by scholars from the
United States and Brazil. I want to embrace this crosscultural event by asking whether American legal hermeneutics is “ugly” and is practiced by “ugly Americans.”
The pejorative cast of this terminology is obvious and
intentional, but it is also ambiguous and multi-layered.
In this Essay I unfold these various dimensions of ugly
American hermeneutics and suggest that—ugly though
we may be—American scholars still can make some
important contributions to the worldwide conversa-

tion regarding legal hermeneutics. It is our plain-faced
pragmatism, perhaps, that is the source of our contribution even as it casts us (sometimes unfairly) as the ugly
Americans.

Ugly to the bone: the failure of
hermeneutical theory in American
legal thought
American legal hermeneutics isn’t just homely, it
is ugly. Downright ugly. Butt ugly. Ugly to the bone. The
desuetude of American hermeneutics is highlighted in
high-deﬁnition technicolor every time the United States
Senate undertakes to conﬁrm a new Justice to the
Supreme Court. In the recent hearings leading to the
conﬁrmation of Justice Sotomayor we had to endure
innumerable idiocies as some Senators seized upon various statements by Judge Sotomayor regarding how her
background as a poor, working class Latina might have
informed her work as an appellate judge.
Senator Jeff Sessions, the ranking Republican on
the Senate Judiciary Committee and himself a failed nominee to the federal bench (Rucker, 2009) suggested that
judges may follow one of two paths, with the fate of the
country riding on the choice that is made.To describe the
dire situation he perceived, Sessions relied on the familiar binary of objective ﬁdelity to pre-established law as
contrasted with the subjective creation of rules under
the guise of judging. This rhetorical framing responded to
President Obama’s statement that he would seek a nominee who displayed empathy, which conservative opponents were quick to equate with lawless favoritism. In his
opening statement, Senator Sessions opined ominously
that the “legal system is at a dangerous crossroads” of
two very different visions of judging.
Down one path is the traditional American legal system, so admired around the world, where judges impartially apply the law to the facts without regard to
personal views.
This is the compassionate system because this is the
fair system. In the American legal system, courts do
not make the law or set policy, because allowing unelected ofﬁcials to make law would strike at the heart
of our democracy. [...]
Indeed, our legal system is based on a ﬁrm belief in an
ordered universe and objective truth. The trial is the
process by which the impartial and wise judge guides
us to the truth.
Down the other path lies a Brave New World where
words have no true meaning and judges are free to
decide what facts they choose to see. In this world,
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a judge is free to push his or her own political or social agenda. I reject this view, and Americans reject
that view (Conﬁrmation Hearing on the Nomination
of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor to Be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
5-6 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary).

Senator Sessions’s courage in rejecting the latter
path is more than a bit undermined by the fact that no
serious person has ever endorsed such a conception of
language, law, and judging.
Senator Chuck Grassley also spoke directly to
the problem of having judges display “empathy” as they
adjudicate cases.
President Obama said that he would nominate judges based on their ability to empathize in general
and with certain groups in particular. This empathy
standard is troubling to me. In fact, I am concerned
that judging based on empathy is really just legislating
from the bench.
The Constitution requires that judges be free from
personal politics, feelings, and preferences. President Obama’s empathy standard appears to encourage judges to make use of their personal politics,
feelings, and preferences. This is contrary to what
most of us understand to be the role of the judiciary (Conﬁrmation Hearing, 2009, p. 17-18 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley, member, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary; Conﬁrmation Hearing, 2009,
p. 1344, statement of Judge Sonia Sotomayor, Supreme Court nominee).

The most embarrassing part of the spectacle,
though, occurs when the nominee kowtows to this absurd conception of judging and reafﬁrms that she will
judge in accordance with the law, as if the law can be
determined and understood before the adjudicative act.
Judge Sotomayor was less the automaton than most, but
she quickly established her bona ﬁdes in the heart of
her opening statement.
In the past month, many Senators have asked me about
my judicial philosophy. It is simple: ﬁdelity to the law.
The task of a judge is not to make the law – it is to
apply the law. And it is clear, I believe, that my record
in two courts reﬂects my rigorous commitment to
interpreting the Constitution according to its terms;
interpreting statutes according to their terms and
Congress’s intent; and hewing faithfully to precedents
established by the Supreme Court and my Circuit
Court. In each case I have heard, I have applied the
law to the facts at hand (Conﬁrmation Hearing, 2009,

44

p. 1344, statement of Judge Sonia Sotomayor, Supreme
Court nominee).

At moments like these, one can only echo Colonel Kurtz: “The horror! The horror!” (Coppola, 1979,
Apocalypse Now).
This is ugly American legal hermeneutics at its
most base, of course, as it occurs in a staged political forum where the substance of the slogans tossed around
by the participants is less important than their symbolic
resonance. I begin with the profane image of conﬁrmation proceedings, though, because it calls forth the fantasies that gird the American legal system. Like a dream
elicited on the psychoanalyst’s couch, the conﬁrmation
hearings reveal the psychology that claims to justify
much of everyday practice, even if most sophisticated
participants—removed from the glare of the television
cameras and lights—would admit that such fantastic accounts lack any descriptive integrity.
The core of the fantasy underlying American legal practice is the claimed ability to separate “the law”
from “the application of law in practice.” The law is abiding, certain, and pre-determined through democratic
processes. The application of law in particular cases is
rigorously attendant to the law such that, even if the
application is not wholly deductive in character, it is still
highly constrained by the law.This fantasy is often equated with the ideal of the “rule of law,” and so preserving
this legal imaginary becomes a matter of utmost importance in preserving the legitimacy of the legal system.
By repeating the fantasy and holding the United States
up to the world as an exemplary legal community precisely because we embrace this fantasy, American legal
hermeneutics generates puzzlement among legal scholars schooled in the continental tradition. American legal hermeneutics is ugly because it is a loud and garish
proclamation of American exceptionalism, paired with
an anti-intellectualism that seeks to insulate our fantastic legal imaginary from serious inquiry, never mind
rigorous critique.
A recent manifestation of the fantasy in action
emerged in District of Columbia v. Heller. No. 07-290 (U.S.
June 26, 2008). In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia casts
his anchor for the stable, unchanging bedrock of historical truth to weather the storm of social change without compromising the rule of law. Scalia is a proponent
of “new textualism” (Strauss, 1998) — an ironic name
to be sure, because his academic and judicial philosophies are reactions to the perceived limitations of legal
texts, standing alone, to secure the rule of law. After the
linguistic-hermeneutic turn in legal theory, no serious
commentator can suggest that words in legal texts can
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have plain meanings that can be applied to a given case
unproblematically. New textualism attempts to restore
the integrity of the legal text by conceding the obvious
contextual and historical nature of meaning before immediately trying to isolate the text in a given historical
moment—the time of its enactment as law—to ensure
that there can be a determinate meaning that persists
into the future. Disregarding the equally problematic
debates among historians about the nature of historical knowledge, the hermeneutics of doing history, and
even the contested nature of historical datum, the new
textualists ﬁnd salvation in the belief that a legal text
acquires determinant meaning by situating it in the historical context of its enactment.
Statutory law might fairly be conceived in simple
communicative terms: the enacted law represents the
work of elected representatives, and democratic legitimacy requires that judges follow this original meaning. Given the relative ease and frequency of amending
statutes to adjust to changing circumstances, one might
admit the theoretical desirability—without, of course,
conceding the practical capability—of limiting the meaning of statutory text to the objective, public meaning of
the text at the time of its enactment. And Justice Scalia
has strenuously made just this argument for years.2
But even if one believes that legislation is a democratically-sanctioned communication of a rule that
must be followed, the Constitution presents a different case. As the constituting document of the polity, it
gestures toward timeless and enduring principles that
can provide stability to society over time. A constitution
that requires constant emendation to deal with changes
in society would not constitute a polity as much as it
would serve as a super-statute.3 On the other hand, a
written constitution must do more than serve as an in-

vitation for judges to rule as they deem best under present circumstances.
Various interpretive approaches to the Constitution during the past forty years reﬂect its status as a
founding document for the polity. John Hart Ely famously argued that the Constitution should be interpreted to
reinforce democratic responsiveness (Ely, 1980, 1978),
Ronald Dworkin contended that moral reasoning is
at the root of constitutional interpretation, (Dworkin,
1996) and Randy Barnett sought the “lost constitution”
that instituted libertarian rights and limited government
(Barnett, 2004, 1998). However, experience has shown
that the complexity and diversity of constitutional litigation makes it difﬁcult enough for courts to articulate a
uniﬁed approach to the First Amendment, not to mention an overriding interpretive approach to the Constitution. The encrustation of precedent appears to be
relatively resilient against the contemporary quest for a
uniﬁed theory of interpretation that produces a method or approach that renders decisions more predictable and legitimate. This was shown most dramatically
when the Court refused to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), in the interest of doctrinal purity. The
Court cited the need to respect the settled expectations engendered by precedents and acknowledged that
constitutional interpretation requires reasoned judgment rather than recovery of a ﬁxed and unchanging
meaning (Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 854-55 [1992]).
Justice Scalia’s remarkable opinion in Heller
thumbs its nose4 at these mediative efforts by the Court
to operate within a plurality of theoretical justiﬁcations
for its practice. In Heller, the Court openly confronted
the question of the interpretive principles that guide adjudication of constitutional rights because it was faced

2
Rejecting traditional references to “intent” or “purpose,” Justice Scalia has endorsed a new textualist approach to reorient statutory interpretation. He agrees that
statutes must be read within their legal context and rejects the idea that judges can refer simply to a literal reading of the speciﬁc language of a statute, but his focus is
the narrow question of the ordinary meaning of the words used at the time of the enactment. He recoils from the general practice of looking to the legislative history
to discern the subjective intentions of the drafters and the purpose of the statute in question, arguing that these open-ended and unreliable concepts permit judges
too much leeway in deciding cases, and—even if these concepts are constraining—are not democratically and constitutionally validated. The following analysis of the
case gives the example. A classic example of his approach can be seen in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989), in which the Court considered a rule
of evidence that permitted the introduction of a witness’ criminal convictions so long as the probative value outweighed any prejudice to the “defendant.” The case
involved a civil plaintiff who was injured while on work release, and the court below held that the prejudicial effect of introducing evidence of his criminal history was
irrelevant because he was a plaintiff in the case (Green, 1989, p. 506-507). Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens engaged in a lengthy and detailed reconstruction of the
drafting history of the rule to determine that Congress was attempting to protect criminal defendants from prejudice (Green, 1989, p. 509-524). Justice Scalia concurred,
but chastised the majority for its inquiry (Green, 1989, p. 527-528). Scalia argued that the court should consider extra-textual materials only to conﬁrm that the literal
reading of the rule was absurd, and then interpret the text by doing the least violence to it (Green, 1989). He insisted that the Court focus ﬁrst on the words of the
text as ordinarily understood, and only if that objective meaning leads to an absurdity should the Court engage in the benign ﬁction that the statute should be read
to cohere with related areas of law (Green, 1989). For additional discussion of the context of statutory interpretation, see infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
3
Justice Scalia criticizes those who would treat statutes differently from the Constitution, stating: “What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a
statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended” (Scalia, 1997, p. 38).
4
Justice Scalia once notoriously used a Sicilian hand gesture that might be considered a stronger version of thumbing one’s nose, and so my stylistic ﬂourish is not
altogether fanciful. See Lattman (s.d.), Justice Scalia’s Gesture: Obscene or Not?
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with a rare case involving an Amendment that it had
yet to interpret extensively. Deciding by a 5-4 vote that
a District of Columbia law effectively banning private
ownership of handguns violated the Second Amendment, the Court held that the Amendment protected
an individual’s right to own handguns for the purpose of
self-defense. The opinions in the case illustrate a sharp
contrast between applying Scalia’s new textualist methodology to the Constitution and more traditional inquiries into precedent, purpose and policy.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion provides the
Court’s ﬁrst thoroughly new textualist reading of the
Constitution. He begins with the central new textualist
belief—that meaning precedes application in a speciﬁc
case—by spending more than ﬁfty pages analyzing the
“meaning of the Second Amendment” before turning
“ﬁnally to the law at issue here” (District of Columbia v.
Heller, No. 07-290, slip op. at 2, 56 [U.S. June 26, 2008]).
Needless to emphasize, he uses a rhetorical device
rather than provide a phenomenology of his decisionmaking. The entire historical discussion is oriented to
the conclusion that ownership of a weapon to protect
one’s home was understood to be within the protections of the Amendment at the time of its adoption.
Consequently, it would be utterly fantastic to assume
that Justice Scalia would have written these same ﬁfty
pages describing the original meaning of the Amendment if he had no idea of the nature of the dispute before the Court! And if he would have done so, it renders
the ban on advisory opinions as to the meaning of constitutional provisions utterly incomprehensible. But let
us ﬁrst trace the manner in which Scalia weaves what
ultimately proves to be a ﬂimsy tapestry.
Combing the historical record to determine
how the public would have understood the famously
ungrammatical and ambiguous Amendment5 at the time
of its adoption, Scalia concludes that the Amendment
means that individual citizens have a right to possess
handguns for their personal defense (Heller, slip op. p.
8-16, 64). His opinion breaks down the single sentence

of the Amendment to its constituent clauses, which he
then deﬁnes by reference to dictionaries from the period. The Court struck down the District of Columbia’s
gun control legislation for violating a constitutional right,
but the Court acknowledged that the rampant urban
violence in Washington, D.C. might lead some to believe
that a right to own guns is anachronistic. Nevertheless,
Justice Scalia wrote, “it is not the role of this Court to
pronounce the Second Amendment extinct” (Heller, slip
op., p. 64).
The contradictions raised by Scalia’s attempt to
provide a genuinely new textualist interpretation of the
original meaning of the Second Amendment are immediately obvious. He begins by ignoring the prefatory clause
regarding the Militia until after he determines the meaning
of what he construes to be the operative clause, yet he
provides no objective grammatical or historical justiﬁcation for this approach.6 He rejects the arguments of professional linguists expressed in an amicus brief even as he
assumes that there can be a truth of the matter regarding
historical research (Heller, slip op., p. 15-16 [majority opinion]). And it is only after determining the original meaning
of the Amendment that Scalia asks whether any precedents
foreclose the application of this meaning (Heller, slip op.,
p. 47). This suggests that stare decisis might trump the
original meaning to some extent, presumably for pragmatic and institutional reasons (Heller, slip op., p. 47). He
acknowledges that the right to gun ownership is not
unlimited, and that there will be exceptions to restrict
ownership by persons who are mentally ill or convicted
felons and possession of handguns in government ofﬁces
or schools. But again, the historical record provides no
justiﬁcation for these potential exceptions that Scalia casually tosses off in dicta.7
As one would expect, the early case law interpreting Heller already is drifting away from the perceived solid
ground of an original understanding of the Amendment.8
It takes little effort to see the cracks in Scalia’s effort to
hew to the original public meaning of the Amendment
and nothing more, even if one grants that determining the

5
The Second Amendment provides, in full: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed” (U.S. Const. amend. II).
6
Heller, slip op., p. 3-22. Justice Stevens chides the majority for taking this approach, arguing that it is a legitimate move for an advocate, but not for a judge (Heller, slip op., p.
8-9, Stevens, J., dissenting).
7
See Heller, slip op., p. 54-55. Justice Scalia suggests that “there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justiﬁcations for the exceptions we have mentioned
if and when those exceptions come before us” (Heller, slip op., p. 63), but it is curious how he came up with this admittedly incomplete list in textualist fashion if he
had not already consulted historical sources. It is patently clear that history is the crutch, rather than the leg, upon which Scalia’s reasoning must stand. See, e.g., United
States v. Gieswein, 346 Fed. App’x 293, 296 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We share the concern... that the Heller dictum [regarding the ability of states to preclude gun ownership by felons] may be in tension with the basis for its own holding, as felon dispossession laws may not have the longstanding historical basis ascribed to them by the
Court. [United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047-48 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring).] The McCane concurrence further worries that Heller’s dictum will
stunt the development of Second Amendment jurisprudence in the lower courts. Id., p. 1049-1050.”).
8
See, e.g., United States v. Knight, 574 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D. Me. 2008) (upholding statutory prohibition on the possession of ﬁrearms by a person under a restraining
order regarding domestic violence). A prominent judge on the conservative Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has chastised Justice Scalia’s opinion for its activist
character, going so far as to proclaim that Heller is guilty of the same sins as Roe v.Wade (Wilkinson, 2009).
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original public meaning is justiﬁed as a matter of legal and
political theory. In the context of deciding Heller as a case
of (almost) ﬁrst impression, the fantasy might be indulged.
But in the day-to-day grind of judging, there is no time to
engage in the luxury of phantasm. “Good for you, Justice
Scalia,” the District Court judges might be heard saying,
“but we have a docket to clear and no time to write
(which is to say, create) history.”9
Let us turn to the dissenting opinions, which can
be faulted most for the degree to which they defer to
the historical fantasy espoused by Justice Scalia. Justice
Stevens dissented based on an interpretation of the
Amendment that was grounded in its text, the history
of its enactment, and the United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 178 (1939), precedent that permitted the ban on
sawed-off shotguns because owning a sawed-off shotgun lacked any nexus with militia service (Heller, slip op.,
p. 42-43 [Stevens, J., dissenting] [discussing Miller]). His
dissent centers on a historical understanding that the
purpose of the Amendment was to ensure that the new
federal government could not oppress the states by
regulating ownership of weapons by able-bodied white
males, who comprised each state’s militia (Heller, slip op.,
p. 17-41 [Stevens, J., dissenting]). In other words, Justice
Stevens makes an argument that combines originalism
and purposivism, claiming that the “proper allocation
of military power in the new Nation was an issue of
central concern for the Framers” that led to the enactment of the Amendment (Heller, slip op., p. 17, [Stevens,
J., dissenting]). Although shaped by Scalia’s historical
tack, Stevens’s dissent operates at a higher level of historical generality. Rather than determine how individual
words and phrases would have been understood at
the time of enactment, Stevens inquires into the
original understanding of the purpose of the Amendment.
In contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion
more openly criticizes the new textualist methodology
and the lack of deﬁnitive evidence for Justice Scalia’s
claim that self-defense is a core value of the Amendment. Breyer’s analysis leads him to conclude that the
new originalist project is bankrupt, even as it triumphs
(by one vote) as the chosen methodology for resolving

the case before the Court. He writes:
At the same time the majority ignores a more important question: Given the purposes for which the
Framers enacted the Second Amendment, how should
it be applied to modern-day circumstances that they
could not have anticipated? Assume, for argument’s
sake, that the Framers did intend the Amendment to
offer a degree of self-defense protection. Does that
mean that the Framers also intended to guarantee a
right to possess a loaded gun near swimming pools,
parks, and playgrounds? That they would not have cared about the children who might pick up a loaded gun
on their parents’ bedside table? That they [...] would
have lacked concern for the risk of accidental deaths
or suicides that readily accessible loaded handguns in
urban areas might bring? Unless we believe that they
intended future generations to ignore such matters,
answering questions such as the questions in this case
requires judgment – judicial judgment exercised within
a framework for constitutional analysis that guides
that judgment and which makes its exercise transparent. One cannot answer those questions by combining inconclusive historical research with judicial ipse
dixit (Heller, slip op., p. 43 [Breyer, J., dissenting]).

The need for judgment is precisely what Scalia wishes to avoid. In his world, every careful and honest
judge should come to the same conclusion because the
historical facts don’t change, although certainly there might
be debates about the historical record in some cases.
It is important to note that Scalia’s opinion successfully draws the dissenting judges into its gravitational pull, and so the dissenters are equally open to
criticism. They too look to history, but they do so in a
manner that appears to provide greater ability to adapt
the text to modern problems; however, they provide
no convincing explanation as to why they don’t simply
operate at a general level of constitutional values and
adopt the best approach to the problem at hand. If history is inconclusive, why must it play such a large role
in their opinions? We might characterize the Heller case,
then, as a battle between faint-hearted originalists and
faint-hearted purposivists.10
Larry Solum is perhaps the most earnest defender of new originalism’s intellectual integrity in the

9

For example, in United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010), the Court determined that a statutory prohibition against the possession of ﬁrearms by
persons convicted of the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence should be deemed to ﬁt with Heller’s non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful, longstandingprohibition[s]” on gun ownership.The Court engages in no historical inquiry, but rather engages in a very traditional purposivist and analogical analysis to conclude that
the statute is not unconstitutional (United States v. White, 2010, p. 1205-1206).
10
Sustice Scalia has been criticized for being a “faint-hearted originalist” because he doesn’t follow the historical evidence strictly, but rather softens it with qualiﬁcations
fostered by his sense of political, legal, and institutional principles (Barnett, 2006; see also Balkin, 2007: arguing that Justice Scalia is forced to adopt a “faint-hearted
originalism” because he begins with an overly narrow conception of originalism that would lead to unacceptable results).
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legal academy.We might forgive Justice Scalia for his ugly
hermeneutics—writing, as he was, under time pressure
in response to a speciﬁc case and with the need to hold
his one-vote majority—but we do, and should, expect
more from academic commentators. Solum seeks to defend the validity of the Court’s turn to “what has been
called ‘original public meaning originalism’—the view
that the original meaning of a constitutional provision
is the conventional semantic meaning that the words
and phrases had at the time the provision was framed
and ratiﬁed.”11 Solum’s phrasing is careful and precise:
new originalism deﬁnes the “original meaning” of a text,
which is not to say that it necessarily deﬁnes the controlling constitutional rule. Solum separates the argument about the meaning of the text from the question
of what role that meaning ought to play in constitutional
adjudication, acknowledging that precedent, historical
practice, and other prudential considerations may well
factor into adjudication after the meaning of the text
has been determined.12 In other words, the original
meaning of a text is a fact in the world that does not,
without more, resolve the normative question of how
the Court ought to decide constitutional cases.13
Moreover, Solum acknowledges that the “original meaning” does not exhaust all possible meanings of
“meaning.”
We can inquire into the linguistic meaning of the
Constitution: what is the semantic content of the words
and phrases that comprise the constitutional text? We
can ask about the applicative meaning of the Constitution: what are the implications of a given clause for a
contemporary controversy? We can investigate the teleological meaning of the Constitution: what purpose
was some constitutional provision intended to serve?
(Solum, 2009, p. 941).
Solum has carefully established that “original
meaning” should be understood to be a semantic fact
that is subject to investigation and retrieval. However,
he has also made clear that original meaning has a contingent relationship to constitutional practice, that resolving the character of this relationship is a normative
matter, and that original meaning does not exhaust the
full scope of the “meaning” of a text.

If Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller is to be forgiven
its theoretical sins because it is a practical exercise of
authority rather than a genuine scholarly effort, what of
the academic defense of new originalism by Solum and
others? Solum properly notes that Heller makes fundamental assumptions about the role that the linguistic
meaning of the constitutional text should play in constitutional practice. These assumptions can be defended
only if constitutional meaning is to be equated with
semantic (linguistic) meaning as it is deﬁned by Solum.
But he concedes that there are different ways to determine meaning, and with each of these various forms
of meaning there are different normative justiﬁcations
for a multitude of hermeneutical practices that might be
pursued. Solum shows his hand by privileging a theoretical approach to meaning, and on this basis he criticizes
the dissenting judges in Heller for not being clear about
the theoretical basis for their reasoning (Solum, 2009, p.
958). But the ﬁrst question is whether an academic effort to fully theorize constitutional practice is practical
or desirable.
If semantic meaning is a useful concept for speaking precisely about the meaning of texts, it does not follow that this concept answers questions of constitutional
hermeneutics. The dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens
and Breyer gesture toward the original understanding of
the operative terms at issue but their analyses are not conﬁned to this understanding of meaning, nor do they establish a delineated hierarchy for consulting various senses of
meaning and normative justiﬁcations in order to reach a
decision. Justice Scalia relies on what Solum terms, apparently with no sense of irony, the “ﬁxation thesis,” which is
the idea that original public meaning is a social fact that
serves as an unchanging bedrock for semantic meaning (Solum, 2009, p; 944-947). But if there is no bedrock that eliminates the challenge of judging—which requires a robust
consideration of a variety of facts, norms and practices to
reach a constitutional decision in the case at hand—then
Stevens and Breyer are not confused and uncertain; they
simply are judging. And there is nothing in the academic
defense of new originalism that indicts those who engage
in prudential judging in complex circumstances, considered
against the background of a rich and variegated tradition.

11

Solum (2009) provides a succinct, yet rich, overview of the varieties of theories that have marched under the banner of originalism during the past forty years and
very clearly deﬁnes the new originalist approach that is at work in Heller to avoid confusions with this intellectual history.
12
Solum argues that it is no more legitimate for critics to assume that new originalists will look only to original meaning than it is for critics to assume that nonoriginalists will never look to original meaning (Solum, 2009, p. 938-939).
13
Solum explains: What then is the relationship between linguistic facts and normative constitutional theory? The answer to that question is that the relationship is contingent.The linguistic meaning of the Second Amendment might be important for constitutional practice—as the Heller majority thought it was. Or one might believe that
other considerations are more important [...] The key point is that the inquiry into meaning in the semantic sense is conceptually distinct from the normative inquiry
about constitutional practice” (Solum, 2009, p. 943-944). And later, “[o]f course, the linguistic meaning of a text may (or may not) constrain the legal effects of the text:
meaning in the semantic sense can inﬂuence meaning in the implicative sense” (Solum, 2009, p. 947).
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Moreover, even if one embraces the new originalist approach, theorists concede that there will be signiﬁcant indeterminacy in reaching the “correct” result
in individual cases. The ﬁxation thesis establishes the
integrity of semantic meaning (the object of interpretation), but the application of constitutional meaning
to speciﬁc cases is admittedly not ﬁxed but rather the
“construction” of constitutional meaning. The import of
this terminology is clear: interpretation is retrieval of a
preexisting meaning and construction is an active use of
meaning to fashion a rule for the case at hand. As Solum
summarizes, there is a temporal as well as a conceptual distinction: “We interpret the meaning of a text, and
then we construct legal rules to help us apply the text to
particular fact situations” (Solum, 2009, p. 973 [emphasis
added]). This simplistic understanding not only rejects
the lessons of contemporary hermeneutical philosophy
without expressly arguing against them, it also implodes
the entire new originalist project on its own terms.
Jack Balkin, in what one must assume is an extended mood of mischief, has entered the debate about
new originalism by claiming that he accepts new originalism as a proper theoretical description of interpretation, but then expanding the scope of construction to
defend Roe v. Wade as a legitimate decision under new
originalist principles (Balkin, 2007, p. 427, 449, 522-523).
If theorists resolutely attend to the original meaning
of the constitutional text at the time of its enactment,
Balkin insists, they will ﬁnd that original meaning originalism “is actually a form of living constitutionalism” (Id.,
p. 449). This is true because the Constitution is comprised of both rules and principles. The original meaning
of a principle such as “equal protection of the laws” is
capacious enough to permit judicial elaboration in accordance with changing social contexts as long as we do
not limit the principle by construing it in terms of how
the drafters intended or anticipated that it would be applied to future cases. Balkin accepts the distinction between interpretation and construction, but argues that
judges traditionally have engaged in constitutional construction and so should continue to do so in the course
of explicating the signiﬁcance of the original meaning of
constitutional provisions to particular cases.
The only plausible response to Balkin’s provocative tack is to look beyond the original meaning of constitutional text in order to secure predictable and desired
results. And it is precisely for this reason that Justice
Scalia claims to attend to precedent, historical practice,
and other experience that might constrain contemporary practice even though these factors admittedly have
no legitimacy by virtue of the original meaning of con-

stitutional text. Keith Whittington, the political scientist
most closely associated with promoting new originalism,
similarly argues that courts should refrain from constitutional construction on democratic grounds, enforcing
the original meaning of the Constitution as they ﬁnd
it, but leaving it to other branches of government to
construct constitutional doctrine (Whittington, 1999b).
On the role of democratically responsive actors to engage in constitutional construction, see generally (Whittington, 1999a). The fact that Whittington’s answer to
Balkin’s reading of new originalism is external to new
originalist theory brings into sharp focus the fact that
new originalism is just a theoretically-clariﬁed vocabulary for pursuing certain political and legal goals, rather
than a means of specifying those goals in an objectively
determinate manner. In short, what Justice Scalia assumes in Heller is nothing less than the justiﬁcation for
his decision.
The triumph of the new textualist methodology
in Heller is interesting because it occurs in the course
of constitutional litigation rather than in the self-referential world of academia. The case shows the power of
hermeneutical theory, at least at the highest level of the
judiciary in the hands of a former law professor, making
clear that new textualism has a very real effect on legal
practice and strongly inﬂuences even the dissenters. But
the stresses of a real case—and particularly the institutional constraints of the appellate process—conﬁrm
that no single theory can deliver a knockout punch that
eliminates the need for judgment. New textualism is a
rhetorical means for framing the issue before the court,
no less and no more helpful than other hermeneutical
approaches. But when it is deployed with smug self-assurance by Justice Scalia as a unitary methodology, new
textualism subverts judicious reasoning and offers the
fantasy that the questions have already been decided,
if only we can discern the historical truth of originalist
meaning and then reasonably construe the proper application to the case at hand.
The more careful scholarly attention to the concepts at work in new originalism makes clear that what
is at stake is a political decision to pursue a certain conception of law and government, rather than an empirical
project of uncovering pre-existing law that may then be
applied. In a sad way, there is not much distance between
the conﬁrmation hearings for Justice Sotomayor and the
articulation of new originalism although the differences
in the sophistication of the speakers and the audience in
these two venues lead to apparently different conversations. The overriding ugliness of American hermeneutics
is the steadfast ideological commitment to the belief
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that meaning exists prior to the need to interpret the
law. From Senator Jeff Sessions, through Justice Antonin Scalia, and on to Professors Solum and Whittington,
this commitment marks the activity as “American” no
less than if they all clamored off the cruise ship wearing
Garth Brooks t-shirts.
In contrast, if there is a single, fundamental principle of sophisticated legal hermeneutics as understood
in many other countries, it surely would be the rejection
of this very commitment. There is irony in this situation.
The great civil codes were a product of the Enlightenment era and the desire to clarify and rationalize private
law, but the intellectual climate in Europe and South
America has engendered a sophisticated academic approach to legal hermeneutics. In contrast, the common
law history in the United States has grown organically as
part of the rapidly changing social, economic, and political environment of the new world, and yet the contemporary theoretical self-understanding of this practice is
increasingly simplistic and reductionist, as if in response
to the hermeneutical vertigo induced by the practices
in question.
How can American hermeneutics hope for respect, not to mention emulation, by those who have
joined modern constitutionalism more recently, if we
embrace such a retrograde approach to legal practice? It is as if American technical experts in agricultural production have descended on a South American
country to explain the freedom-fostering virtues of
the global capitalist economy in foodstuffs to farmers
whose lives—political, social, and economic—have been
wholly controlled by multinational corporations for the
past century. It is unlikely that disagreement will ensue;
rather, the likely and deserved response is that the ignorance simply will be ignored.

Beauty is only skin deep: looking
past the ugliness of American
hermeneutics
If American hermeneutics is ugly, it is not necessarily the case that this results from the fact that it
is ugly Americans who are interpreting legal texts and
providing a theoretical defense of that practice. In defense of my countrymen, I suggest that ugly Americans
cannot so easily be caricatured. There is ugly hermeneutics at work, to be sure. But, like the ugly American
in the novel who works on behalf of the local people
in a straightforward and unassuming manner, American hermeneuts may provide some guidance to world
scholars by developing their plain-faced pragmatism in
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a manner that is never entirely subordinated to their
ugly theoretical fantasies. Like the well-meaning couple
from Kansas who order a meal in Porto Alegre in a loud
and slow voice because they assume that Portuguese
speakers will understand English if they just concentrate
hard enough, American legal scholars tend to be an embarrassing group. But, like that Kansas couple, American
hermeneuts do not live their daily lives in this manner.
The reality on the ground in Kansas is different from
the fantasy life in which the couple indulges while on a
guided tour of Brazilian tourist spots. And, that reality is
instructive in important ways.
Brian Tamanaha argues that the great theoretical battle between formalism and realism in American
jurisprudence has been a ﬁgment of the collective imagination that ignores the complexities of legal practice
by employing reductionist accounts (Tamanaha, 2010).
Formalism was a theoretical development that responded to the desire to render law into a science beﬁtting
university study (Tamanaha, 2010, p. 29-32). But Tamanaha’s review of the historical evidence leads him to
conclude that “it is hard to ﬁnd anyone other than legal
academics, theorists especially, attesting to these beliefs
(although academics also expressed skepticism on this),
while there are plentiful indications that lawyers found
these claims ill ﬁtting or absurd” (Tamanaha, 2010, p. 3132). The disconnect occurred because academic lawyers
emphasized the presumed coherence of legal principles
and the deductive character of reasoning from those
principles to results in given cases, whereas lawyers and
judges were enmeshed within an existing and dynamic
legal system that didn’t approximate such a clean system of principles (Tamanaha, 2010, p. 51). Lawyers and
judges also (and, to some extent, consequently) were
faced with applying the legal system to speciﬁc cases in
situations that could not support deductive reasoning
(Tamanaha, 2010). Perhaps oversimplifying Tamanaha’s
careful historical account, we might conclude that the
theoretical accounts of law that we associate with formalism never were accurate with regard to the complexity of legal practice and never were seen as such by
the participants in legal practice.
Tamanaha demonstrates that the great uprising
of legal realism in America between the world wars was
not a dramatic rejection of a formalist ideology that had
seized the legal imagination as much as a continuation of
insights into the character of legal practice that had been
made for decades (Tamanaha, 2010, p. 67). Drawing from
the path-breaking work of Karl Llewellyn,Tamanaha suggests that we can break the unhelpful caricature of the
battle between formalists and realists by embracing a
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“balanced realism” that roots its theoretical inquiry in
the practice at hand.14 Legal practice shows us that law
is Janus-faced: always open to solving unforeseen problems creatively as well as always rooted in established
practices that provide certainty. The “false story” of the
great battle between formalists and realists for the soul
of the American legal system obscures the degree to
which each theoretical orientation captures only a part
of the complex reality of legal practice.15
Tamanaha is correct to identify Llewellyn as a
central ﬁgure who resisted the theoretical urge of his
colleagues and sought a balanced realism. Llewellyn has
always appeared to many commentators to be a mysterious charlatan because he rejected the false alternatives
offered at the height of the realist movement: either law
is principled and deductive or it is political and indeterminate. Llewellyn was re-working the ancient conception
of law and politics in an effort to overcome the sterile
academic debates that raged around him. At the end of
his career, Llewellyn famously called for the study of law
as a liberal art, grounded in a combination of technical
proﬁciency and broader learning.16 The aim of Llewellyn’s
“liberal education” was to develop the rhetorical competence to deal with the situation that Tamanaha names
“balanced realism.”
In his supplementation of Bramble Bush, Llewellyn
recognized that the need to bridge the practice-theory
divide was at the center of his life’s work. He emphasized that the craft of law “cries out for the development and teaching of its theory, as it does also for study
by doing in the light of that theory” (Llewellyn, 2008,
p. 171). He named this needed approach “Spokesmanship,” deriving it from the theories ﬁrst developed in
ancient Greece as “Rhetoric—in essence: the effective
techniques of persuasion.”17 Too often, Llewellyn argued,

Spokesmanship has been cast too narrowly as no more
than the ability to add ornament to legal argument as
part of advocacy.
But “Spokesmanship” has come to be for me a more
signiﬁcant focus than any of the above, including and
proﬁting from the essence of each of them while also
reaching out to cover such matters as the values of
having buffers between contending principles or the
differences between the rival goals of victory and
reconciliation or the problems and obligations of leadership both in the small and in the large. In a word,
Spokesmanship with special attention to work on the
legal side seems to me to offer the wherewithal of a
full-ﬂedged theoretical-practical discipline with cultural value equal to its professional value [...].18

Llewellyn regarded Spokesmanship as a rhetorical practice with both theoretical and practical dimensions that can equip lawyers for the challenges of their
profession.
Llewellyn’s conception of legal rhetoric was central to his realist philosophy although many critics badly
misread him as an ivory-tower relativist who believed
in law’s absolute indeterminacy. In fact, Llewellyn found
ample stability within the practice of law while at the
same time acknowledging room for critique and reform
(Patterson, 1990, p. 598-599; reviewing Llewellyn, 1989).
Llewellyn wrote that the totality of the practice of law
was one of the most “conservative and inﬂexible” of social phenomena, and yet every case offered the opportunity for the judge and lawyers to shift the direction of
thinking (Llewellyn, 1989). Llewellyn anticipated the central tenet of contemporary legal hermeneutics by arguing
that the meaning of a legal rule is known only in its use,
and that using a rule always is a reformulation of the rule

14
Tamanaha describes “balanced realism” as follows: “Balanced realism has two integrally conjoined aspects—a skeptical aspect and a rule-bound aspect. It refers to an
awareness of the ﬂaws, limitations, and openness of law, an awareness that judges sometimes make choices, that they can manipulate legal rules and precedents, and that they
sometimes are inﬂuenced by their political and moral views and their personal biases (the skeptical aspect).Yet it conditions this skeptical awareness with the understanding
that legal rules nonetheless work; that judges abide by and apply the law; that there are practice-related, social, and institutional factors that constrain judges; and that judges
render generally predictable decisions consistent with the law (the rule-bound aspect).The rule-bound aspect of judging can function reliably notwithstanding the challenges
presented by the skepticism-inducing aspect, although this is an achievement that must be earned, is never perfectly achieved, and is never guaranteed” (Tamanaha, 2010, p.
6). Tamanaha is certainly correct; but, as I describe later in this article, there is much more work to be done in ﬂeshing out his account of a balanced realism.
15
Pierre Schlag (2009) provides a jurisprudential account of the centrality of the formalism-realism debate to the form of American law, and at this level connects it
to the current battle between new textualism and purposivism as played out in Heller. Schlag helpfully reminds us that casting off ugly American hermeneutics is not a
simple matter, although there is room for critical moves against the grip of reigning ideological forms.
16
Llewellyn (2000) challenged the growing belief that preparing students to practice law was inconsistent with the research ideals of the university: “The truth, the truth
which cries out, is that the good work, the most effective work, of the lawyer in practice roots in and depends on vision, range, depth, balance, and rich humanity—those
things which it is the function, and frequently the fortune, of the liberal arts to introduce and indeed to induce. The truth is therefore that the best practical training
a University can give to any lawyer who is not by choice or by unendowment doomed to be hack or shyster—the best practical training, along with the best human
training, is the study of law, within the professional school itself, as a liberal art” (Llewellyn, 2000, p. 376). Llewellyn also repeated his frequent insistence that law students
read broadly and deeply to acquaint themselves with the context in which law operates (Llewellyn, 2000, p. 388-389).
17
Llewellyn explains: “There is a theory of advocacy, or spokesmanship, or rhetoric (which aspect lends the name is immaterial)—a theory which has formed the basis
of a liberal art since classic times; a theory, moreover, which is empty and vain save as it builds on and with deep understanding of the psychological and ethical nature
of cause or of client, of tribunal or other addressee, of society and of the law-governmental phase thereof” (Llewellyn, 2000, p. 382).
18
Llewellyn (2008, p. 171-172). This is his vision of a legal education in the tradition of the liberal arts: attending to the rhetoric of lawyering in its broadest sense
(Llewellyn, 2000, p. 389).
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(either by expansion or contraction) even when the case
feels like a simple matter of deductive reasoning.
Thus, the task of the judge is to reformulate the rule so
that from then on the rule undoubtedly includes the
case or undoubtedly excludes it. “To apply the rule”
is thus a misnomer; rather, one expands a rule or contracts it. One can only “apply” a rule after ﬁrst freely
choosing either to include the instant case within it or
to exclude the case from it. […]
Matters are no different, only more sharply highlighted,
when a new case is such that one ﬁrst must mull over
whether to include it within an existing category, or must
choose which existing category to include it in. […]
For we all, lawyer not least, are mistaken about the nature of language. We regard language as if words were
things with ﬁxed content. Precisely because we apply to
a new fact situation a well-known and familiar linguistic
symbol, we lose the feeling of newness about the case;
it seems long familiar to us. The word hides its changed
meaning from the speaker (Llewellyn, 1989, p. 74-75).

His message was philosophically radical, but he
was no linguistic skeptic, cultural nihilist, or political
revolutionary. Llewellyn ﬁrmly believed that lawyers can
and should be educated to move within the rhetoricallyrich narratives of law that are at once open situations
and constrained ﬁelds of meaning.
Tamanaha wonders how legal scholars and political
scientists could have bought so completely into the false
story of the great theoretical battle between formalists
and realists. I would rephrase his question by asking how
Llewellyn could have been misconstrued and ignored for
so long. Ugly American hermeneutics is a product of this
dysfunctional situation, in which theory arises as grossly
simpliﬁed and reductionist accounts in an effort to contain
a practice that has long been underway without need for
such theoretical underwriting.The latest skirmish between
new textualism and purposivism is an ugly distraction from
serious theoretical and empirical investigation of how
plain-faced judges and lawyers practice law. In short, ugly
American hermeneutics conceals the good work of ugly
(plain, pragmatic) American hermeneuts.
The stultifying effects of new textualism as seen
from the broader view that I am advancing can best be
explored in the context of statutory interpretation,
where the theory ﬁrst gained resonance. The interpretation of statutes in the United States has a long history
that is shaped by the English common law legacy and the

peculiarities of American legal history.19 In the common
law era, English courts viewed statutes as isolated efforts to articulate the principles of the common law, and
so they construed statutes narrowly against established
common law doctrines. In the democratic ethos of
nineteenth-century America, judges were regarded with
suspicion and accused of undermining legislation with
their exercise of “equitable interpretation,” but courts
generally continued to interpret statutes narrowly even
without a guiding theoretical dogma that the common
law was supreme. In the twentieth century, judges more
readily acknowledged the primacy of legislation, but
they focused on effectuating the purpose of statutes
rather than pretending that there was a “plain meaning”
to apply as ministerial and bureaucratic matter. At times
during this history, there were theoretical claims regarding the proper approach to statutory interpretation, but
judges generally assumed a partnership with legislatures
to seek pragmatic solutions by employing an eclectic
mix of interpretive strategies that acknowledged their
comparative institutional competencies.20 The relatively
recent focus on securing adjudicative certainty through
theoretical purity represents a lack of faith in this long
tradition of what William Popkin has termed “ordinary
judging” (Popkin, 1999, p. 151-255).
Against the modern efforts of intentionalists,
textualists, and new textualists to identify the holy grail
of objective statutory interpretation, Bill Eskridge has
argued in favor of a “dynamic” approach to statutory
interpretation that is theoretically rigorous without being dogmatic or reductionist. Drawing on contemporary philosophical hermeneutics, Eskridge contends that
judges generally use practical reasoning and a variety
of interpretive strategies to determine the meaning of
statute for the case at hand (Eskridge, 1994, p. 55-57;
Eskridge and Frickey, 1990, p. 321-22). He summarizes,
with co-author Philip Frickey, how his central theoretical conclusions arise from the practices involved.
First, statutory interpretation involves creative policymaking by judges and is not just the Court’s ﬁguring
out the answer that was put “in” the statute by the
enacting legislature. An essential insight of hermeneutics is that interpretation is a dynamic process, and
that the interpreter is inescapably situated historically.
[...]
Second, because this creation of statutory meaning is not a mechanical operation, it often involves

19

The brief historical overview in this paragraph is drawn from Popkin (1999).
Bill Eskridge (2001) persuasively argues in similar fashion that courts used an eclectic blend of text, history, purpose, context, and norms to interpret statutes in the
early years of the new Republic, underscoring the extent to which theory-driven approaches are a relatively new phenomenon.

20
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the interpreter’s choice among several competing
answers. Although the interpreter’s range of choices
is somewhat constrained by the text, the statute’s
history, and the circumstances of its application, the
actual choice will not be “objectively” determinable;
interpretation will often depend upon political and
other assumptions held by judges. [...]
Third, when statutory interpreters make these choices, they are normally not driven by any single value
[...] The pragmatistic idea that captures this concept
is the “web of beliefs” metaphor. [...] [They then argue that another helpful metaphor is Charles Pierce’s
contrast of a chain of arguments no stronger than
the weakest link and a cable woven from various
threads.] […]
In many cases of statutory interpretation, of course,
the threads will not all run in the same direction. The
cable metaphor suggests that in these cases the result
will depend upon the strongest overall combination of
threads. […]
Our model holds that an interpreter will look at a
broad range of evidence—text, historical evidence,
and the text’s evolution—and thus form a preliminary
view of the statute.The interpreter then develops that
preliminary view by testing various possible interpretations against the multiple criteria of ﬁdelity to text,
historical accuracy, and conformity to contemporary
circumstances and values. Each criterion is relevant,
yet none necessarily trumps the others (Eskridge and
Frickey, 1990, p. 345, 347-348, 351-352).

Eskridge contends that dynamic statutory interpretation is a descriptive account of how judges resolve
interpretive problems, but also that it is normative to
the extent that it cautions against unrealistic efforts
to reduce statutory interpretation to a single valence.
Courts rarely endorse Eskridge’s dynamic approach
expressly, but he argues that the great weight of legal
practice supports the hermeneutic understanding of
statutory interpretation as practical reasoning.
In an autobiographical essay, Karl Jaspers once
explained that he rejected a career in law because it
struck him as an unproductive mental juggling with ﬁctions, whereas he sought to understand reality.21 The
current efforts to theorize American law through the
simplistic bifurcation of “interpretation” and “construction” epitomize the characteristics that Jaspers
criticized. And this is not a new story in American legal theory. Francis Lieber was one of the most important theorists of legal hermeneutics in America in the
nineteenth century, bringing the romantic and idealist

traditions of German hermeneutical philosophy to bear
in the American setting. In Legal and Political Hermeneutics (Lieber, 1839), he argued that preserving the rule of
law required the identiﬁcation and clariﬁcation of the
“immutable principles and ﬁxed rules for interpreting
and construing” the law (Lieber, 1839, p. viii). Adopting
the intentionalist approach of romantic hermeneutics
against crude “plain meaning” ideology, Lieber emphasized the distinction between interpretation (discovering the speaker’s intended meaning) and construction
(determining the proper application of the intended
meaning to the case at hand) in precisely the terms that
contemporary proponents of new textualism deploy
these terms.
Lieber’s approach has more nuance and pragmatism, though, inasmuch as he concluded that the
art of legal hermeneutics requires both interpretation
and construction, and that the latter cannot be cabined
by theoretical limits or methodology (Id., p. 64). Consequently, as Lieber was articulating the philosophical
bases for intentionalism, his honesty and attention to
pragmatic considerations simultaneously undermined
the theoretical utility of intentionalism. If construction
is inevitable and always premised on judgment, then the
intended meaning of the text can provide only a veneer
of determinacy and objectivity for the legal system. Deciding when to construe a legal text in a manner that
departs from its intended meaning is not something that
is controlled by the text itself, and so Lieber recognized
that every construction has the potential to undermine
the rule of law. Because no rule can prevent this excess,
Lieber’s pragmatic response was simply to caution interpreters to be good judges when they constructed the
legal rule (Lieber, 1839, p. 121-222, 136). One hundred
and ﬁfty years later, the same debate ensues with “new
textualism” replacing “intentionalism,” but with less acknowledgment that the necessity of construction overtakes efforts to shrink the scope of interpretation to a
point where it can be determinate. Like the movies in
the Star Wars franchise, each iteration of mainstream
American hermeneutical legal theory apparently will be
worse than the predecessor.

Conclusion
If beauty is only skin-deep, so is ugliness. The redemptive features of American hermeneutics are found
in legal practice, which is never successfully subjugated by

21

“The study of law left me unsatisﬁed, because I did not know the aspects of life which it serves. I perceived only the intricate mental juggling with ﬁctions that did not
interest me. What I sought was perception of reality” (Jaspers, 1956, p. 159).
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the fantastic—in the full sense of that word—accounts
provided by theorists. Looking past the superﬁcial theoretical dressing, American legal hermeneutics is vibrant
and sophisticated. Although American hermeneutical
scholars generally are untutored in, and dismissive of, the
relevance of Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, or Derrida to
legal hermeneutics, this situation does not amount to a
complete embarrassment. Ugly American hermeneutics
provides a healthy dose of skepticism about the utility
of embracing sophisticated philosophies simply for the
sake of the sophistication; Parisian fashion, after all, is not
designed for everyday wear. The theoretical simplicity of
American hermeneutics is a bracing corrective to the
tendencies toward the mystical, baroque, and paranoid
that often lurk within the European traditions. Ugliness
has its virtues.
At the same time, there is a possibility of drawing from more sophisticated hermeneutical traditions
without sacriﬁcing the pragmatism and practice-oriented perspective that deﬁnes the American legacy of
written constitutionalism and common law adjudication. In my work I have read Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics as radicalizing Heidegger’s fundamental
ontology by taking a “turn” toward dialogue rather
than following Heidegger’s “turn” to poetry and the ineffable language of the Gods (Mootz, 2010, 2006). This
jurisprudential framework is also used by Bill Eskridge
in his work on statutory interpretation, and provides a
sophisticated extension of Francis Lieber’s pathbreaking efforts in the early years of the American Republic.
There is no need to choose between plain-faced pragmatic practices and sophisticated theorizing. Rooting
sophisticated hermeneutical theory in the practices at
hand is itself a hermeneutical theory, and it is precisely
at this juncture that the conversation between scholars from Brazil and the United States might be most
productive.
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